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Abstract:
Weber [1983] argues that the expected equilibrium prices of
identical objects auctioned sequentially to expected profit
maximizing bidders with symmetrically distributed privately-known
values (with each bidder winning at most one object) should all
be equal. In fact, in actual auctions, the prices seems to tend
downwards. We show that for similar objects—objects having
statistically identical, independent values— the trend will be
upwards in some cases, but the overall trend will be downwards
for any value distribution with bounded support.
We also consider non-similar (but still independent) objects
and argue that the seller benefits from selling first the objects
that contribute most to bidders' profits. To the extent that
bidders most highly value those objects with high variance— high
variance in bidders' values leads to high winner profits—
sequentially auctioning the option to choose one of the remaining
objects implements a good order.

In troduc ticn :
In many actual sequential auctions of similar objects—
auctions of farmland, of used restaurant equipment, of a bankrupt
construction firm's inventory, of nursery stock, and of dairy
cattle— the price tends to drop from one object to the next.
This contrasts with the existing theory. In particular, Weber
[1983] argues that in sequential auctions of identical ocjects to
expected profit maximizing bidders with symmetrically-distributed
privately-known values (with each bidder allowed to win at most
object), the prices will be a martingale; ex ante, each object
has the same expected price. More generally, with affiliated
information, the prices will be a submar tinga 1 e ; the prices will
tend to drift upwards. Of course, a particular realization of a
submar tinga 1 e might consist of a strictly decreasing sequence of
numbers. But this would be an atypical outcome. And prices in
actual auctions seem to trend downwards far too often to be
explained as atypical outcomes.
Assuming the objects to be identical misses what turns out
to be an essential element of the above mentioned auctions. 7ne
objects are not indeed identical. For example, the used
restaurant tables that were auctioned sequentially were basically
similar, but varied in structural soundness, in condition of the
table top, and in condition of the base. Similarly, eacn dairy
cow differed slightly in age, milk yield history, and genetic
stock; all these factors affect bidders' values. So, lnsteac of
a bidder's value varies from object to object.
We model the values of different objects to a particular
bidder as being independent draws from some fixed distribution.
This may indeed be just as unrea 1 is t ica 1 1 y extreme an assumption
as is the assumption of identical objects
—
that is, an assumption
that the values are perfectly correlated. But, the independent
objects assumption provides an insightful contrast to the
identical objects assumption. Going all the way to this extreme
also simplifies the analysis and the interpretation of the
results; in particular, the independence across objects avoids
the effect of signalling (as studied, for example, by Qrtega-
Reichart [1968] and Enge 1 brecht-Wiggans and Weber [1987], ana
which underlies Weber's upward price trend result.)
Our results contrast with those for identical objects. in
particular, the price trend now varies with the distribution of
the bidders' values. For certain distributions of values,
including the exponential, the expected prices increase strictly
from one object to the next. Eut, for other distributions,
including the uniform, the expected prices decrease strictly.
And, in general for bounded distributions, for large enough
numbers of objects, the overall price trend is downwards. That
is, our model's predictions seem consistent with the sustained
downwards seguences of prices in actual auctions.
The analysis also reveals the forces underlying the price
trends in seguential auctions. A closer look at one of these
—
the effect of decreasing opportunities— has practical
implications in the case of non-similar objects. in particular,
the seller benefits from first selling the objects that
contribute most to the bidders' profits. if the seller aoes net
know which objects these are, then to the extent they are cne
objects that bidders consider most valuable, sequential-,
auctioning the right to choose one of the remaining objects
implements the desired order.
The Basic Model
:
We start by defining our model. In particular, imagine that
n objects will be auctioned one after another without re^er\/e.
Initially, there are n+m (m>0) expected profit maximizing
bidders. Each bidder may win at most one object; thus, the
number of bidders drops by one in each auction and there will be
n-j+m+1 bidders in the j"61-1 auction.
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To specify the informational assumptions, let X*,j denote a
random variable with outcome Xi.j, Bidder 1 has a value of :< ipJ
for object j; bidder 1 knows x^.j when bidding on object j, but
does not yet know Xi.j + i, Xi,j+2 , ... , x* „ n . (For notational
simplicity, i always ranges from one to n+m, while j always
ranges from one to n; bidders who have already won an object can
simply ignore subsequent x i(J-'s.) Assume that for each 1, X * . x ,
Xi.-, ... X i , ,-, ar& identically and independently distributed.
Also, assume symmetry— but not necessarily independence— across
bidders; more precisely, the joint distribution of X x „ j , X-.j,
... , X ^. m ,j is symmetric in its arguments. Finally, assume that
everyone knows the joint distribution of the bidders' values.
In the previously mentioned examples, the auctions followed
the common ascending-price oral format. In our model, we use
Vickrey [1961] auctions
—
sealed-bid sales in which the hignest
bidder wins, but pays only an amount equal to the highest losing
bid. Given the private values nature of our model, the Vickrey
auction provides a simple, seemingly plausible approximation to
actual oral auctions.
An Equi 1 l br mm
To derive an equilibrium bidding strategy for our sequential
auctions, we will start with the last auction and work toward the
first. To derive the condition applied iteratively in this
process, focus on any one auction, say that of object j (j\n).
Imagine that the strategies used in subsequent auctions will be
independent of how others bid in this auction (but not
necessarily independent of who wins this auction); given the
independence across objects, this will be true in the equilibrium
that we identify for our model. Then fixing the strategies used
by bidders in subsequent auctions fixes the expected profit to
each bidder in subsequent auctions (conditional on the outcome of
this auc t ion ) .
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We will repeated refer to these profits. So, let L *. . _,
denote the expected profit to bidder 1 from auctions j+i, J+2,
...
,
n conditional on bidder 1 losing object j . For the moment,
also consider the case in bidders may win more than one object--
ln this case, the value x * ,. j may depend on what objects 1 won
previous to the auction of object j— and let W i(J' denote the
expected profit to bidder 1 conditional en winning object j
.
Since object n is the last object, define L i>n and W Iin to be
zero for all bidders 1.
This allows us to consider the auction of object j in
isolation from other auctions. In particular, in auction j,
bidder 1 in effect has a privately-known net value of •< ±
.
j + Wi,j
— Li, j for winning. So, the standard argument for vickrey
auctions with privately-known values (see for example,
Enge 1 brech t-Wiggans [1991]) yields the following:
Proposition 1: If bidder i knows x L
. j , Li, j , and Wi.j (and the
latter are independent of how bidder i bids in this auction) when
bidding on object j, then bidder i should truthfully bid equal to
the net value that would be gained by winning this auction.
More precisely, bidder i has the dominant strategy in this
auction of bidding equal to < ± , j + Wi.j - Li.j.
If bidders may win any number of objects, and each bidder s
value for a set of objects equals the sum of the individual
values, then L A ,j equals Wi,j, and each bidder i has the dominant
strategy of bidding equal to x^.j. That is, bidders can bid in
each auction as if it were the only auction. We later refer to
this as the case of "unrestricted, independent auctions."
Repeated application of Proposition 1 defines an equilibrium
strategy for a sequence of auctions. Specifically, in the last
auction, let bidders bid truthfully (that is, equal to their
Xi, n 's) , just as they might be assumed to do if this were the
only auction. Then, calculate the Li, n-i's and the W i( n-i s
resulting from such bidding. Next, let bidders in the next to
-6-
last stage bid truthfully as defined by the proposition i her
calculate the L ipn -;'5 and the W i( p,-2 '5 resulting from this two-
stage strategy. Iterate this process; the subsequent calculation
of equilibrium profits will be for the equilibrium defined by
this process. (The equilibrium strategies so defined sr° nor.
dominant strategies; in particular, Li.j and W*,j depend on how
other bidders other bidder 1 bid on objects subsequent to object
j, and if for some reason of their own, each bidder other than 1
bid extremely large amounts on each object, then bidder i s La.j
and Wx.j would be zero for all j, and 1 should bid differently
than if they were non-zero. ) .
Return now to the case in which each bidder may win at most
one object. Thus, W i#j equals zero for all 1 and j. Hnc Li.j
will be independent of i; thus, we hereafter simply write !__, .
Expected Equilibrium Profits:
To derive the expected profits at the equilibrium resulting
from iteratively applying Proposition 1, start by looking at the
contribution to the bidders' profits made by the auction of any-
one object, say object j. In particular, let tt^ denote the
expected profit in auction j (ex ante to the bidders seeing their
values for object j) to each bidder; since there will Ce n-j+m+i
bidders on object j, the bidders together have an expected profit
of (n-j+m+1) Ttj in this auction, all of which profit goes to the
one bidder who actually wins.
Next quantify rtj . Clearly, if each bidder 1 bids a
constant— in particular, Lj— more than the value x i(J , then the
winner's profit will be exactly this constant amount greater than
if everyone bid equal to their corresponding x ± . _, . But
Engel brecht-Wiggans [1991] establishes that when bidders bin
equal to their true values, each bidder has an expected profit
equal to the expected marginal contribution this bidder makes to
the expected total social value. More precisely, if each bidder
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l were to bid x ± . j on object j, then ttj would equal v(n-j+m+lj -
v(n-j+m), where v(k) denotes the expected social value
E[ max { X j.
.
_,- ,
X
-,_,-, ..., Xr.j}] of an object sold in an auction
with k bidders. In fact, each bidder 1 bids Kt.j + L j , and so
the n-j+m+1 bidders together actually have an expected profit of
(n-j+m+1) [v(n-j+m+l ) -v (n-j'+m) ] + Lj .
Now, to get Lj-i— the total expected profit to each bidder
from auctions j, j+1, ..., n just before bidders see their value
for object j—consider two cases. If 1 loses object j, 1 gets
nothing from auction >o , conditional on losing object j,
has an expected profit of Lj from auctions j and j-1, j -2 , ...
n. Alternatively, if l wins object j, l gets nothing frcm
subsequent auctions. So, conditional on winning, i nas an
expected profit of (n-j+m+1) [ v ( n- j +m+ 1 ) - v ( n- j' +m ) ] + Lj . And,
given the ex ante symmetry of all bidders, each of the bidders
has a l/(n-j+m+l) chance of winning the auction. Thus, Lj-j.
equals [ 1 / ( n- j +m+l ) ] {(n-j+m+l) [ v ( n- j +m+ 1 ) - v ( n - j +m ) ] + L
_,
j +
[1 - l/(n-j+m+l)] Lj . Simplifying this expression yields Lj-i =
Lj + [ v ( n-j +m+l ) -v ( n- j +m ) ] . This together with Ln = yields the
foil owing
:
Proposition 2: If for each object, each bidder on that object
bids truthfully (as defined in Proposition 1), then eacn bidder 5
total ex ante expected profit equals the sum of each bidder 3
expected profits from individual unrestricted independent
auctions with appropriate numbers of bidders. More precisely,
Lj-i = Ektj [ v ( n-k + m+1 ) -v
(
n-k+m ) ] (= v(n-j+m+l) - v ( m ) ) .
Expected Equilibrium Prices:
Now we compute the expected equilibrium prices Pi, p = , ... ,
p„ . Clearly, the expected price of an object auctioned to k
bidders must be the expected social value v(k) minus the k
bidders' expected profit from this object. But, we previously
found that n-j+m+1 bidders together have an expected profit of
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( n-j +m+l ) [ v ( n-j +m+ 1 ) -v ( n-j +m ) ] + Lj on object j , and that !__,-
equals v ( n-j + m ) -v ( m ) . So, appropriate substitutions and
simplifications yield the following:
Proposition 3: The equilibrium price pj of object j is given by
the expression v(m) - ( n-j +m ) [ v ( n-j +m+ 1 ) -v ( n-j + m ) ]
.
Let us calculate the expected equilibrium price Pj for
several distributions. One, if the bidders' values ar^
independent samples from the uniform distribution on the interval
[a,b] (with a large enough so that all bids exceed z&ro , or any
other specified reservation price), then v(k) = b - ( b-aj / ( k+1 )
,
and thus pj = b - ( b-a ) [ 1 / ( m+1 ) + ( n-j +m ) / ( n- j +m+2 ) ( n- j+m+1 ) ]
.
Clearly, as n-j increases, this increases toward b - ( b-a ) / ( m-+-i ) .
So, as j increases, pj decreases; for the uniform distribution,
the expected prices form a strictly decreasing sequence.
Two, if each value equals a constant c (large enough so that
all bids exceed any reservation price) plus an independent sample
from the exponential distribution with mean u, then v(k)—v(k— 1) =
u/k, and thus pj = v(m) - ( n- j +m ) u/ ( n- j +m+ 1 ) . Clearly, as n-j
increases, this decreases toward v ( m ) -u . So, as j increases, pj
increases; in this case, the expected prices form a strictly
increasing sequence.
Even though the sequence of prices may go in either
direction, we can make a more specific, potentially practical
statement. In particular, if the support of the distribution is
bounded above— this rules out the second example above, but would
be a plausible assumption for actual auctions— the expected
prices will tend to decrease.
To obtain the desired result, define k=n-j+m+l and rearrange
the expression for pj to get p r-1 _ k ^. m H-i = v(m) - k [ v ( k ) - v ( k - 1 ) ] +
[ v ( k ) -v ( k - 1 ) ] . The first term of this expression is independent
of k. The negative of the second term equals the k bidders'
combined expected profit at the dominant strategy equilibrium in
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a single-object Vickrey auction, and therefore equals the
difference between the largest and the second largest of k
identically (but not necessarily independently) distributed
samples. (See Proposition 1 of Enge 1 brec ht-Wiggans for a formal
derivation.) Clearly, for a bounded (symmetric) distribution,
this difference must eventually go to zero as k goes to infinity,
and thus the second term eventually disappears. (In contrast,
for the exponential distribution, it remains constant, equal to
the mean of the distribution. ) Since the seconc term is always
negative and eventually goes to zero, and since the sum of the
second and third terms is clearly always negative, the sum or the
second and third terms must eventually go to zero. find so, for
large enough k, the expected price will be greater than for
smaller k. But large k correspond to auctions early in long
enough sequences. So, overall, the prices tend downwards.
Discussion
Three phenomena affect prices in sequential auctions. One
effect— that of decreasing opportunities—works to raise prices
on later objects. In particular, in contrast to losing in the
last auction, losing in an earlier auction still leaves a bidden
with opportunities to make a profit before the end of the
sequence; not all is lost if you lose in an early auction. So,
bidders might bid more aggressively in later auctions.
The other two effects arise from the fact that in our model-
-and
,
perhaps, quite typically— later auctions have fewer
bidders. One, with fewer bidders, bidders might bid less
aggressively. Two, at least in our model, the expected social
value generated by an auction drops as the number of bidders
drops. Together these two effects work to lower prices on later
objects. Perhaps, indeed, this last effect— the dependence of
the social value on the number of bidders
—
drives our results.
But even so, except in the un rea 1 is tica 1 1 y extreme case of pure
common values, this effect exists to some degree.
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Setting an Order for Selling the Objects:
In the case of identical objects, each object has the same
expected price ex ante. The expected total revenue to the
seller(s) is unaffected by the order in which the objects are
sold. Even if the auction consists of objects owned by different
sellers, ex ante, the order in which the objects ar^ sold ma*es
no difference to any one seller's expected revenue.
In contrast, the order does make a difference for non-
identical objects. In the case of statistically identical
objects, the order makes no difference to the expected total
revenue to the sellers. But, to the extent that expected prices
decrease from one object to the next, each seller should like to
see his or her own objects offered for sale early in the
seguence
.
In the case of dissimilar objects, the order also afreets
the expected total revenues. To illustrate, consider a simple
example with two objects. Imagine that all bidders have very
nearly the same value for object A, but have guite different
values for object B. Consider the two possible orders for these
two objects; assume that bidders bid truthfully as defined in
Proposi tion i
.
First, sell object A last. Then all bidders will bid
essentially the same amount in the last auction, and this last
auction generates essentially no profit for its winner. So, in
the first auction— the auction of object B— bidders bid very
nearly truthfully. And thus, in total, the bidders' combined
profit in the two auctions barely exceeds the profit they could
expect from a sale of object B alone.
Second, sell object B last. Now the last auction generates a
substantial expected profit. So, in the first auction, bidders
now shade their values by a substantial amount. Even though all
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bidders will be bidding very nearly the same amount, this amount
will be substantially less than their values for object A. Thus
the first auction also generates a substantial expected profit.
Together, the two auctions in this order generate nearly twice
the expected profit for the bidders as does the other order.
Also consider the effect of the order on the expected total
social value. Changing the number of bidders hardly affects the
expected social value of object A. Not so for object 3;
increasing the number of bidders increases the expectec socia:
value. Thus, selling object B first— that is, selling object B
in the auction with the larger number of bidders
—
generates a
greater expected total social value for the two objects than does
the other order.
Both effects work in the same direction. Selling object B
first yields both a higher expected value for the objects and
lower expected profits for the bidders. Clearly, the seller— or
the sellers together, if there is more than one
—
benefit from
selling object B first.
It is the variance, not the mean, of the distribution that
matters. In particular, increasing the variance in the bidders
values for an object tends to increase both the bidders profits
and the effect that changing the number of bidders has on the
expected social value. So, in general, roughly speaking, objects
with high variance in the bidders values should be sold first.
(In our example, even if, with probability one, everyone values
object A much more than object B, selling object B first
generates the greater expected total revenue.
)
Finally, consider the option auction— a sequential
auctioning of the right to chose one of the remaining objects.
If the bidders' values vary more from one object to another than
from one bidder to another, then such option auctions tend to
sell the objects in order of decreasing value; "value" here could
be defined as the average of the means of the bidders' marginal
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distributions for the value of the object. And, to the extent
that high values correspond to high variances, the option auction
tends to implement a desirable order of sale. So, an auctioneer
unfamiliar with bidders' preferences for a particular collection
of dissimilar objects may prefer the option auction. Indeed, in
the sale of restaurant equipment, the auctioneer turned to the
option auction when faced with selling four very used, very
different major appliances.
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